Introduction
The advancement of technology in the 21st century has intensely impacted all aspects of society, including the conduct of political warfare (PW). Cyberspace has emerged as a new domain for states to pursue their strategic objectives, both in times of peace and conflict. This essay will examine if cyber subversion (CS) has transformed the nature of PW and discuss how effective CS is as an end to political violence (PV) through a comparative analysis of Russia/Soviet Union (USSR) and the United States (US).
The essay will argue that while CS has modernised PW’s tactics and increased its reach, the target society’s resilience and the subverting state’s strategy continue to shape subversive campaigns' strategic effectiveness for achieving PV. However, the case studies reveal that translating the tactical advantages of CS into lasting strategic gains remains difficult, as target societies can adapt, and the blowback can undermine the subverting state’s legitimacy. The essay will be structured as follows: First, it will provide historical context on US-Soviet PW during the Cold War. Second, it will analyse the evolution of Russian and American PW and subversive tactics in the cyber era through illustrative case studies. Third, it will compare and contrast the two states' contemporary approaches to CS, assess the key factors shaping the effectiveness of their respective campaigns, and evaluate the strategic implications for PW.
Background of PW during the Cold War
PW, a term coined by George Kennan, refers to the use of all means short of conventional war, such as propaganda, covert action, disinformation, proxy conflicts, and economic pressure, to achieve strategic objectives and shape the global balance of power (Kennan, 1946; Rid, 2020a: 7–15). The Cold War between the US and USSR was characterised by intense PW, with each side employing subversive tactics to undermine the other while avoiding direct military confrontation. For the USSR, subversion was a fundamental component of their global revolutionary strategy, soviet leaders believed that the spread of communism required weakening capitalist states from within through the exploitation of internal contradictions and the mobilisation of marginalised groups (Naimark et al., 2017: 15–37). The US, in contrast, embraced a strategy of containment, first outlined by diplomat George Kennan in his renowned “Long Telegram”, The containment doctrine sought to meet Soviet expansionism with “unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world,” as Kennan memorably phrased it (Kennan, 1946; Kennan, 1947). This approach aimed to block further Soviet aggression and expansion through a combination of economic assistance to vulnerable states, psychological warfare, and the credible threat of military force if red lines were crossed.
Ideological competition between capitalism and communism provided a powerful impetus for subversion, as each side sought to demonstrate the superiority of its system (Rid, 2020c: 143). In addition, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the USSR, embedded mutually assured destruction in great power politics and raised the stakes of direct military confrontation, making PW a more attractive option, further enhancing the attractiveness was technological advancements in areas like radio and print media which enabled the global dissemination of propaganda (Treverton, 1988: 3–48). Moreover, the process of decolonisation created new opportunities for the superpowers to compete for influence in the developing world (Odd Arne Westad, 2005: 23–28, 345). While the specific tactics of PW evolved throughout the Cold War, the underlying logic remained consistent: to achieve geopolitical objectives through the subversion of adversaries. The US and USSR both devoted significant resources to these efforts, with mixed results, the conduct of PW allowed them to challenge each other’s power and legitimacy on a global scale but also entailed significant risks, from the exposure of covert operations to the unintended consequences of destabilising foreign governments (Johnson, 1992). These dynamics would shape the development of PW in the cyber age.
Case Study 1: Russia/Soviet Union
During the Cold War, the USSR viewed PW as an essential tool for furthering the global socialist revolution, the Soviet strategy relied heavily on active measures “aktivnyye meropriyatiya,” a broad range of overt and covert techniques which included disinformation, propaganda, forgeries, front groups, and paramilitary operations designed to weaken opponents, aimed at creating a favourable operating environment, and influence foreign public opinion (Rid, 2020b: 9, 239, 277, 108–128; Boghardt, 2009). The KGB played a central role in orchestrating PW throughout the Cold War. Through its First Chief Directorate, they conducted sophisticated influence operations aimed at shaping foreign perceptions and undermining the US and its allies by aggressively promoting narratives portraying the US as an imperialist power, highlighting racial tensions, economic inequality, and unpopular foreign interventions to discredit the American system (Boghardt, 2009; Andrew, 2000b: 1–51). Furthermore, the KGB was also involved in providing extensive covert support to leftist parties and revolutionary movements around the world, from the Italian Communist Party to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, as well as other parties, trade unions, peace movements, and anti-colonial struggles, all in with objective to weaken the liberal-rules based order (Andrew, 2000c: 331–335; Treverton, 1988: 3–48; Andrew, 2000: 270, 515, 485–489).
In the post-Soviet era, Russia has adapted its subversive strategies to the digital age while maintaining the underlying goal of undermining Western cohesion. Under President Putin’s leadership, Russia has weaponised new technologies to conduct PW with expanded scope and precision. CS has been a manifestation of these technologies and is defined by “exploiting vulnerabilities to secretly infiltrate a system of rules and practices in order to control, manipulate, and use the system to produce detrimental effects against an adversary” (Maschmeyer, 2021). Consequently, CS has emerged as a key tool for Russia for meddling in foreign elections, exacerbating social divisions, and spreading disinformation through the internet (Polyakova et al., 2018).
Russia’s modern subversive tactics during the 2016 US presidential election were demonstrated through an extensive campaign that carried out cyber espionage, strategic leaks, and social media manipulation aimed at undermining the legitimacy of democratic processes and swinging it towards Donald Trump (Office of The Director of National Intelligence, 2017). Beyond the US, Russia has employed similar cyber-enabled interference in elections across Europe, aiming to boost Euroscepticism and support for pro-Russian forces while weakening support for NATO and the EU (Polyakova et al., 2018). Russia’s political warfare against Ukraine since 2014 exemplifies how it combines CS with traditional active measures. After pro-Western protests led to the ouster of Kremlin-backed Ukrainian President Yanukovych, Russia initiated a multifaceted campaign to undermine the new government and seize control of Crimea and eastern Ukraine (Renz, 2016). Russian state media and covert online social media accounts inundated Ukraine with false stories portraying the post-Maidan government as a “fascist junta” oppressing Russian-speakers, while Russian intelligence agencies hacked critical infrastructure, government ministries, and election systems to sabotage Ukraine’s political functioning (Willett, 2022; Roy, 2014; Lannoszka, 2016).
As these examples illustrate, while inflicting real damage on American and European political cohesion, the strategic payoffs of Russia’s CS campaigns have arguably not matched the intensity of effort and blowback incurred. Provoking US countermeasures and alienating potential European partners may have undermined Russia’s overall position. This demonstrates how the tactical advantages of CS—secrecy, deniability, and psychological impact—do not automatically translate into lasting strategic gains if the target society proves resilient and the subverter faces costs to its reputation. Russia continues to embrace subversion as a cost-effective way to project power and compensate for its conventional military and economic limitations vis-à-vis the West. This strategic continuity reflects a deeply entrenched view of PW as a permanent and pervasive element of geopolitical competition.
Case Study 2: United States
During the Cold War, the US relied heavily on covert action and propaganda to contain Soviet influence, prevent the spread of communism, and advance its interests abroad consistently viewing subversion as a cost-effective alternative to direct military confrontation. The CIA orchestrated clandestine operations aimed at subverting leftist governments and supporting anti-communist forces in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Treverton, 1988: 3–48). These efforts ranged from policies like the Marshall Plan, a key component of Kennan’s containment policy, to disseminating pro-American news and cultural content through outlets like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, to more aggressive measures like sponsoring opposition parties, labour unions, and guerrilla movements (Treverton, 1988: 3–48). Moreover, covert regime change operations became a key tactic of US PW, with the CIA conducting coup d’états against democratically elected leaders perceived as threats to American interests. These ranged from propaganda and economic warfare to paramilitary activities, as seen in Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954, and Cuba 1961 (Treverton, 1988: 3–48; Corke, 2007: 58–60). The US also sought to bolster anti-communist forces around the world, from the Contras in Nicaragua to the mujahideen in Afghanistan, with the objective of countering Soviet influence (Odd Arne Westad, 2005: 23–28, 345). Notably the long-term strategic implications for the US were not fruitful.
As the Cold War ended, the US began to shift its PW doctrine to account for the rise of transnational threats like terrorism and the growing importance of information technologies, the 9/11 attacks and subsequent Global War on Terror saw a resurgence of US-sponsored subversion, now aimed at non-state actors and terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The American strategy aimed to undermine the ideological appeal and operational capabilities of terrorist organisations, emphasising winning the hearts and minds through public diplomacy and strategic communication, while also pursuing military objectives through indirect means including conducting covert operations and proxy wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria (Egnell, 2010; Long, 2022).
On the technological front, harnessing its technological superiority, the US has developed sophisticated capabilities to conduct PW through CS, from hacking and surveillance to online propaganda and disinformation. For example, the Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear program demonstrated the potential of cyber tools to sabotage adversaries' critical infrastructure without the use of force (Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011). This joint US-Israeli operation set back Iran’s nuclear ambitions and demonstrated the strategic impact of offensive cyber operations. More recently, the US has taken a more active role in countering Russian and Chinese CS, which has been instrumental in assessing and recommending strategies to enhance the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy and international broadcasting activities, particularly in response to the sophisticated PW, disinformation, and influence operations conducted by Russia and China. These efforts are driven by the recognition that both Russia and China engage in aggressive information campaigns designed to undermine U.S. influence, sow discord, and exploit societal cleavages (U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2024).
It is clear the US has been involved in both the defensive and offensive sides of PW, while its subversive tactics have adapted to geopolitical and technological shifts, the underlying logic of using asymmetric means to weaken adversaries without direct conflict remains constant. Yet in an era of blurred boundaries between war and peace, the normative and strategic implications of PW are increasingly complex, even for a superpower like the US.
Comparative Analysis
Both Russia and the US have a long history of conducting PW by employing subversive tactics to undermine adversaries and project power globally, however, the rise of cyberspace has given states ways to deliver strategic payloads with greater effectiveness. These differences in approach reflect the two states' distinct strategic cultures and positions in the international system. As a revisionist power seeking to undermine the US-led liberal order, Russia sees CS as an asymmetric tool to balance against Western strengths (Adamsky, 2015). With a higher tolerance for risk and a more fluid definition of war and peace, Moscow is willing to push the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in cyberspace. On the other hand, the US, as the hegemon seeking to maintain the status quo, is more risk-averse and constrained by liberal democratic norms in its conduct of PW (Carnegie et al., 2022; Mearsheimer, 2019).
Despite these differences, both cases illustrate how CS has qualitatively changed the nature of PW in the 21st century, cyberspace has collapsed the temporal and spatial barriers that traditionally limited subversive campaigns. Bits and bytes have enabled states to target foreign audiences directly, continuously, and intuitively without relying on intermediaries like press outlets or covert agents to conduct PW. The anonymity and ambiguity of cyberspace have made it easier for states to carry out PW through subversive cyber operations with plausible deniability, lowering the risks of blowback or escalation. At the same time, as online information flows increasingly influence people’s predispositions, perceptions, emotions, and behaviours, the widespread use of social media and mobile devices has made societies more susceptible to external manipulation.
However, while cyber capabilities have expanded the tactical possibilities for subversion, their ability to directly catalyse lasting PV has been limited. PV is the “deliberate use of power and force to achieve political goals,” and both Russian and American campaigns have had difficulty translating temporary psychological effects of PW into lasting strategic gains that achieve lasting PV (World Health Organization, 2002). Despite the sophistication of Russia’s influence operations, they have often backfired by galvanising Western countermeasures, as seen in the US hardening of electoral infrastructure after 2016 presidential elections, which has not succeeded in fundamentally destabilising American democracy or precipitating widespread, lasting unrest. Yet, despite sowing discord and exposing societal fissures, the 2016 election interference did not translate into a strategic victory enabling Russian revisionism, US institutions ultimately proved resilient (Francois and Lin, 2021). Likewise, the exposure of US covert cyber operations like Stuxnet, while achieving precise effects like sabotaging Iran’s nuclear program, has undermined its soft power and image abroad. Nevertheless, it did not spark broader PV or regime change within Iran (Smeets, 2018). If anything, the public exposure of the cyber campaign undermined its covert intent and handed Tehran a propaganda victory.
For both Russia and the US, CS has proven more effective at shaping narratives and perceptions than as a direct catalyst for PV, for instance, Russia’s use of CS to conduct PW has eroded public trust and heightened polarisation in the West and has been most effective in countries with pre-existing political cleavages and weak media ecosystems that it can exploit (Mejias and Vokuev, 2017). But its ability to instigate large-scale upheaval causing PV has been constrained by the coherence of its strategy and the resilience of target societies. The US on the other hand, has been able to use CS to contest adversary disinformation and impose costs on malign actors, but it has been most successful when integrated with other instruments of national power and guided by clear policy objectives. However, its reticence to embrace CS as aggressively as Russia has limited its strategic impact.
The paradox of CS is that the same features that make it attractive tactically—its low costs, anonymity, and psychological impact—can also limit its strategic utility by making it seem illegitimate, uncontrollable, and escalatory. While a potent addition to the statecraft, CS alone has proven insufficient to spark or sustain widespread PV without a coherent strategy and vulnerable target. Comparing the Russian and American experiences reveals that while CS has transformed the tactical landscape of PW, its strategic effectiveness remains constrained by the same variables and contextual factors that have historically shaped subversive campaigns. The cyber domain has expanded the scope, speed, and stealth of subversive activities, but not necessarily their decisiveness in achieving strategic political ends. As Russia and the US continue competing between war and peace, they will likely integrate CS with other instruments of national power. Nonetheless, the case studies suggest CS is better suited in conducting PW and shaping the information environment than as a primary engine for achieving PV.
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