Intelligence politicisation is considered a policy challenge. It can lead to intelligence failures or policy mishaps. However, there are those who argue that intelligence politicisation can be a positive thing. Can intelligence politicisation be a positive thing?
Introduction
Effective national security depends on maintaining integrity and objectivity in intelligence operations. Intelligence agencies have a key role to play in gathering, analysing, and disseminating information that forms the bedrock of defence strategies. Nevertheless, the process can be severely impaired by politicisation of intelligence whereby estimates are influenced or changed to conform with political goals (USNWC 2014). In this essay, the paper argues about the specific effect of intelligence politicisation on national security contending that it distorts decision-making processes undermining effectiveness of intelligence operations, erodes trust in intelligence agencies and may ultimately lead to strategic missteps. Through looking at the case study of Iraq War pre-intelligence assessments and discussing its negative impacts, this essay shows why it is important to maintain objectivity and integrity in such operations for safeguarding national interests.
The Nature of Intelligence Work
Intelligence works are crucial elements in national security and policy formation, giving insights that inform strategic choices. The validity of intelligence products depends on the objectivity which is the use of evidence over personal opinion or political expediency (DNI 2021). National Intelligence (ODNI) underscores the importance of “timely, insightful, objective, and relevant intelligence” to inform national security decisions (DNI 2021). Trust between intelligence agencies and those who use their products necessitates that the former assure the latter that intelligence products are not tainted by biases and politics (USNWC 2014). Politicalization of intelligence occurs if skewed analysis allows it, deliberately or otherwise. This distortion of intellect has been demonstrated by exaggeration, cherry-picking information as well as failing to report inconvenient facts (Agrell & Treverton 2015).
Politicising Intelligence removes neutrality from what should be a neutral evaluation thus undermining trust. A case in point is creation of alternate facts- convenient lies for politics contrary to objective analysis (Gentry 2008). This makes all levels of government lose faith in these organisations since credibility declines. Furthermore, when doing intelligence work it is important to be objective to avoid cognitive bias which are predictable mental errors in human cognition that can lead into an impaired analysis when not checked for (Cohen 2019). When intelligence gets slanted towards policy or politics it becomes compromised hence unreliable resulting in loss of confidence among clients who depend on it. For accuracy and integrity in intelligence analyses maintaining objectivity is very necessary (Agrell & Treverton 2015).
The Inevitability and Impact of Cognitive Biases
Cognitive biases are systematic biases in logical reasoning that come about as a result of efforts by the brain to simplify information processing (Cook & Smallman 2008b). These cognitive biases are an inherent part of human decision-making and are highly essential within the context of intelligence process (Cook & Smallman 2008b). Consequently, there is a need for analysts to be aware of these biases and understand their implications on objective decision making. In this regard, cognitive biases such as confirmation bias and availability heuristic can make analysts search for information confirming preconceptions or attach undue importance to easily accessible information. Thereby distorting the entire analytical process hence flawed conclusions at times leading to serious policy and national security decisions. Theoretical underpinning is not enough evidence of. For instance, preceding intelligence estimates about the Iraq war provide historical cases where these fallacies resulted in significant blunders regarding intelligence (Cook & Smallman 2008c).
Adding to this, confirmation bias resulted in an overestimate of weapons of mass destruction by analysts and policymakers without adequate evidence (Cook & Smallman 2008c). As a way mitigating for this, intelligence agencies have introduced structured analytic techniques such as red teaming – taking on adversarial stance against the prevailing beliefs; they also emphasise on the significance of analytic tradecraft standards which necessitate clear articulation of doubts and alternative explanations too (Riccardo Viale 2021). This could however be complicated by politicisation of intelligence using a case whereby analysts may feel obliged to concur with what is expected from them by politicians thus making it even more difficult to deal with cognitive biases (Riccardo Viale 2021). This can give rise to a dangerous situation where instead being checked these prejudices are enhanced thereby further undermining objectivity and reliability in intelligence work especially when it comes to formulating policies that can jeopardise international peace and stability as well as disrupt individuals’ normal lives through unforeseen wars or conflicts caused due incomplete analysis or understanding brought about by political interference (Lundborg 2022). Therefore, it is essential that these biases be managed effectively while at the same time recognizing politicisation as one factor that can dramatically worsen the effects of cognitive biases (Whitesmith 2020).
The Politicization of Intelligence leading up to the Iraq-War and The Negative Consequences of Intelligence Politicization
Iraq’s WMD programs before the U.S invasion in 2003 provide an obvious example of the politicisation of intelligence (Friedman 2012). Serious problems were identified by several inquiries, such as the 2004 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigation, with how intelligence was manipulated to support war (United States Senate 2004). Although there were wrong assessments made by the intelligence community on Iraq’s WMD, some evidence suggest that officials in the administration chose what they wanted from among intelligence findings supporting their case and downplayed other evidence countering their position (United States Senate 2004). For example, in arguing that Iraq posed an immediate threat NIE was used by officials widely but divergent views and caveats were grossly disregarded (Cook & Smallman 2008a). As regards its assessment on Iraq’s nuclear program, The agency expressed a low level of confidence.
Again, raw forms of unverified intelligence reports were released to journalists to back up the case for going to war. Such is the case with the New York Times’ story about aluminium tubes which claimed that Iraq had sought after nuclear weapons despite doubts within the intelligence community (Barstow et al. 2004). The statements of Vice President Cheney implying that Iraq had been actively collaborating with al-Qaeda did not find basis in any analysis conducted by the US intelligence agencies but helped make linkage between Iraq and 9/11 attacks (Kessler 2019). Within this context, it can be concluded from the Senate report that administration officials utilised substantiated by intelligence statements regarding issues like his chemical and biological weapon possession whilst failing to communicate discrepancies as well as uncertainties present in America security establishment (Soufan Centre 2020). Some argue that though there is no evidence of direct pressure from White House to change analytic judgments; however, many people opine that actions taken by the administration supported judgments favouring war.
The consequences of political manipulation of intelligence before the Iraq War have been devastatingly widespread throughout history (Thurston 2013). Among other things, distortion of facts led to a misrepresentation and misconception about the belligerent nation’s potentiality evidenced by overestimation regarding its WMD capabilities (Lundborg 2022). The reliability required for accurate research results was undermined due to political engagement in intelligence that led to distrust of intelligence agencies by both policy makers and public. On the other hand, the credibility of the intelligence community was in serious doubt because no WMD stocks were found in Iraq after the invasion (Cook & Smallman 2008c). It is still instructive of how politicisation can damage the integrity of the intelligence process, resulting in policy failures and strategic mistakes; selective release of information explaining tactical reasons for going into a war without taking into consideration subtleties and uncertainties is an example.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that intelligence politicisation is a major threat to national security as it affects the impartiality and dependability of intelligence analysis. Using the example of intelligence assessments before the Iraq War, politically biassed decisions can misinform actions thus undermining trust in intelligence organisations and leading to strategic mistakes and humanitarian catastrophes. The paper also describes how intelligence politicisation increases cognitive biases’ impacts and corrupts the process of intelligence itself. Ensuring that political manipulation does not infiltrate into intelligence activities demands concerted efforts aimed at minimising cognitive biases influence while preserving integrity of intelligence. Ultimately, operational integrity is maintained by independence and objectivity of intelligence work vis-à-vis effectiveness of national defence.
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